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Introduction
ORGANIZATION AND ARTICULATION OF INTERESTS IN SPAIN (1978-1988)
The subject of interest groups in Spain and their relationship to the political
system is so complex that any attempt at detailed analysis should be the work of a
research team. The objectives of this paper are much more modest. Our aim is solely
to contribute to the considerations of some conceptual and methodological problems
involved in the study of interest groups and to advance some tentative hypotheses
about Chambers of Commerce as interest groups.
In contrast to the output of other European countries and particularly the
United States, the bibliography on interest groups in Spain is extremely limited. There
are a number of reasons for this.
First of all, studies of this type are by no means as common in the field of
Political Science in Spain as they are in Anglo-Saxon countries. As will be seen
somewhat further on in this paper, most of the existing studies stem from other
disciplines, particularly sociology and history. But Political Science's late blooming
interest is not simply an academic matter. Instead,. it is closely related to the very birth
and development of the contemporary Spanish State. Moreover, the incidence of
neocorporatist theories should not be overlooked, particularly as regards the most
recent studies on interest groups in Spain. We must recognize that when the academic
and scientific discussions of the mid-Seventies were exported to Spain they triggered
a spate of theoretical and empirical studies which provide an essential basis from
which to develop our work, but also present some methodological differences which I
think deserve mention here.
1. Interest groups and the discontinuity of the Spanish political system
Any study of interest groups in Spain must necessarily take as its principal
frame of reference the discontinuity of Spain's political system during the past century.
Professor Linz' well-known work on the subject is highly significant (1). In the
introduction, he reminds us that in this period of time Spain experienced, "a liberal
oligarchic monarchy, a military dictatorship, a short-lived democratic republic, almost
forty years of the Franco government and now a democracy in the process of
consolidation".
The lack of a stable system of political representation and the parallel
development of. a party system made it extremely difficult to study the structure of
pressure groups and their relationship to political parties and the State's
decision-making process. There is little background information available and this
makes it hard to advance any working hypotheses.
A good deal has been written about the history of the Restoration period, but
none of it from the specific angle of Political Science. The material that does exist
reveals that there are two different schools of thought as regards the connection
between the political elite and interest groups. one school, the leading spokesman of
which is Varela (2), maintains that they were autonomous while the other school, whose
leading advocate is Tuñón de Lara (3), insists that there were close links between the
political elite and the interest groups.
Although there are more studies on the organization and actions of interest
groups during the II Republic, they are basically descriptive and only provide some
rough hypotheses about their actions. Social conflict and political polarization
combined with the short-lived Republican experience prevented interest groups from
ever really consolidating. The special nature of the channels of political representation
that existed during the Franco regime conditioned the study of interest groups and their
relationship to the political system at that time (4). The absence of political parties
caused the different "families" belonging to the regime to be treated as interest groups.
However, as Professor Linz points out, "in many ways these two groups (ACNP and
Opus Dei) do not fit the normal definition of the term "interest group" because they are
political-ideological groups rather than representatives of social interests" (5). A
subsequent work by Hermet (6) shares this viewpoint. "The inner circles of the Franco
regime are not permanent committees for different interest groups. They are a complex
mixture, not so much specifically based on socio-economic elements as on their
formula for government and the type of person they produce" (7).
Moreover, some studies point out that the political elite of the Franco years
were linked by economic interests (8). In addition, there is other work (9) which reflects
the pluralist ideas that inspired the SCRC's Comparative Policy Committee at the end
of the Fifties, which, as we shall see later on, had a decisive influence on studies of
interest groups. There are also a few theoretical studies on the subject of representing
interests (10).
2. Neocorporative theories and the study of interest groups
Reestablishment of democracy meant a radical change in the channels of
political representation available to the various social groups and in the role played by
these groups.
It is generally acknowledged that political parties not only occupied the
political limelight and monopolized the media but were also the focus of academic
interest during the first stage of the new system. It was not until the 1980's and the
onset of social pacts and the debate on neocorporative practices that the various
social groups began to attract the interest of the academic world. Professor Linz
inspired two studies (11) which use a pluralistic approach to analyze how labor
organizations and employers' associations were established within the context of
political transition. But the most extensive body of work on interest groups examines
them within the context of neocorporatism (12) and the organization and behavior of
various professional groups (13)
Schmitter is considered the father of neocorporatist theories. His first articles
(14) signaled the start of considerable production on this subject, which is still being
added to today (15). In Spain a team led by Professor Prez Diaz participated in a study
on "The Organization of Business Interests" which embraced most of the Western
industrial countries (16). The introduction to this study states: "This is not an illustration
or empirical example of collective corporate action viewed from traditional angles such
as the theory of pressure groups or lobbies" (17). The study aimed to differ from
traditional pluralistic theory in its point of departure and even claimed to advance a new
concept. Other authors (18) appear more cautious when defining the conceptual
framework of new studies. They favor an evolutionary theory somewhere between
pluralism and corporatism, carefully pointing out the unanswered questions that might
prevent the consolidation of these new tendencies.
Nevertheless, they are all agreed on the need to carry out specific studies on
interest groups and the relationships between them and the decision-making process
or processes in the various public administrations.
On an international level the controversy about the significance of corporatism
and its relationship to pluralism is intense. Almond (19) and Berger (20) can be
considered among the leading exponents of the two opposing stances. In examining
the general lines of various corporatist studies, Berger makes it clear that he does not
agree with the studies produced in the 1970's. "The main problem is how interests are
shaped by socioeconomic, historical, organizational and political processes. And the
problem of the kinds of organization, far from being a question of tacit adaptation to the
circumstances, is analyzed as part of the actual problem of defining these interests"
(21). "They analyze the particulars of the national historical background, the role of the
State and the inherent instabilities in the way the system of representation operates."
(22).
On the other hand, Almond writes on these same studies with the viewpoint
that corporation is a variety of pluralism and maintains that the differences of focus
stem from the change in academic and cultural perspective: in the Sixties these studies
were cultivated by U.S. academics working in the field of Political Science. Now most
of the work on the subject is coming out of Europe and being done by sociologists and
historians. Nevertheless, the root of the controversy lies in the hypothetical differences
in methodology. Almond defends the pluralists from the typical accusations: on the one
hand, that they paid little or no attention to history, government policies and
intra-organizational factors; on the other, that they considered all groups as equals in
terms of their power to exercise pressure and also defended the "social status quo".
To a certain extent, this controversy has been repeated in the recent debate on the role
of the State (23).
As Robert Salisbury (24) points out, since the Seventies the field of Political
Science has been adjusting its studies on pressure groups to the changing conditions
in advanced capitalist societies and incorporating the theoretical and methodological
advances of the scientific community. Recently Salisbury (25) has produced a work in
which he applies the theory of conflict and coalition to the study of interest groups.
There have also been attempts to compare "pressure" in Western democracies and
genuinely Socialist countries (26). Other new and interesting approaches include
applying theories of political choice to pressure groups (27) as well as interacting
studies on the political elite and interest groups (28).
Only with a detailed knowledge of the different interest groups and how they
are organized, how representative they are and how they influence public
decision-making will it be possible to advance in the discussion about the theoretical
and methodological differences between pluralism and corporatism.
Chambers of Commerce in Catalonia
1.- Chambers of Commerce as a subject of study
The impact of neocorporatist theories and Spain's experience with social
pacts makes the various social powers and their activities a subject of undeniable
interest. Media reports about interest groups and their real or imagined activities are
beginning to appear and there is a noticeable increase in books that tend to popularize
the lobbyist's activity or profession (30). I personally feel that Spain lacks empirical
studies on pressure groups. Some of the recent work on employers' associations (31)
mentions the role of the Chambers of Commerce and this should be contrasted with
earlier studies on the subject.
Examining the role of Chambers of Commerce first implies formulating a
series of working hypotheses which should be tested throughout the study (32). Chief
among them are whether or not Chambers of Commerce are superimposed on
employers' associations, duplicating their activities and serving the same clientele;
whether the two types of organizations represent the same interests and whether there
is a possibility of conflict between them.
Secondly, and given the fact that membership in Chambers of Commerce is
compulsory, a study of what causes certain companies to be active members and what
kind of incentives the Chambers give them should replace the usual study on the "logic
of membership". Thirdly, and because of their peculiar legal status as public
corporations and the fact they are consulting agencies, we can not only identify their
positions on different pieces of proposed legislation and on the actions of the various
public administrations but can also measure their capacity to pressure these
administrations. Last but not least, we can identify the connections between the
political elite and Chamber of Commerce leaders.
2. - Chambers of Commerce and the CEOE (Spanish Employers' Association)
(apropos of the discussion on Chamber of Commerce income)
The discussion on the 1989 Budget Act gave us an opportunity to test one of
our first working hypotheses.
Chamber of Commerce income largely consists of a percentage of corporate
taxes (until recently this was 2%). Furthermore, a small surcharge on the licenses
required to engage in industrial or trade operations goes to the Chambers, although
this accounts for a very small percentage of their total income.
The announcement that the proposed budget for 1989 (33) would cut this
percentage to 1% triggered an interesting press campaign and caused the various
Parliamentary groups to take sides on the issue, thus providing us with fresh
information.
We shall begin with a summary of how Parliamentary discussions and the
press campaign were timed.
I
Table1
Press Campaign
Reports opposed to the Chambers: 26-IX, 10-X, 25-X
Reports in favor of the Chambers: 30-IX, 12-X, 7-XI
Unbiased reports: 11-X, 16-X, 31-X, 10-XII
(Final agreement)
The foregoing tables and information gleaned from meetings with members of
the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce enable us to establish the nature of the
negotiations between the various key organizations and identify their respective
pressure activities.
Confrontation between the Chambers of Commerce and the CEOE dates back
to before the Budget was presented and was caused by the refusal of several
companies to pay their dues to the Chamber (34). It was then that the government
announced its plan to cut the fee in half. There was an immediate public outcry. Most of
the Parliamentary groups announced that they were in favor of maintaining the status
quo. It should be noted here that the Socialist members of Parliament proposed an
audit of the Chambers' financial statements which was virtually identical to the
proposals made by AP and MC. A first attempt at pressure and negotiations involved
the Chambers of Commerce, the Government and three Parliamentary groups and
resulted in recognition of the need for audits. At the same time the press began
reporting on the Chambers' "surplus treasury" (35).
Negotiations between the key organizations continued and when amendments
were presented to the Senate, the Socialists presented one that was “justified for
technical reasons” and proposed that the percentage be increased to 1.5% with 0.5%
going to a Chamber of Commerce Export Promotion Plan to be proposed to the
Council of Chambers and regulated by the Ministry of Economy and the Treasury. The
Socialists' proposed amendment coincided in part with the amendments proposed to
Congress by AP and MC, but further proposed increasing Government Control over
Chamber of Commerce operations. It should also be noted here that two of the new
groups proposing amendments (DC and PL) justified their proposals with a supporting
text, the content of which was literally identical to that of the Socialists.
This is a typical example of pressure group action (here, the Chambers of
Commerce themselves) when faced with pending legislation. The Chambers
negotiated directly with the Government and also through the Opposition groups in
Parliament while the media voiced opinions both for and against the issues involved.
R. Martinez' study (36) contains information on the business community's
attitude towards the pending legislation.
The use of different channels of contact are shown below (37):
Table2
3. - Chambers of Commerce: Their organization and powers
Although some authors trace their origins to the trade guilds that existed before
the Liberal revolution, Chambers of Commerce in Spain first appeared as such during
the 19th century Restoration (39) and coincided with the first attempts at voicing
special interests (40).
In the beginning membership was not compulsory, but legislation enacted at the
beginning of this century (41) established what were to be the essential legal
characteristics of the Chambers: they were to be public corporations and membership
would be compulsory. This legislation established that they would be "consulting
agencies to the Public Administration" and "shall necessarily express their opinions on
projects, trade agreements, reform of Customs duties, +X'Xsals and ordenances, the
Commercial Code, social legislation and, in general, all issues in which the State
affects the interests they represent" (42).
When the II Republic was proclaimed the Chambers issued a statement that
illustrated their position vis-a-vis the new regime:
"The Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Navigation act autonomously to promote,
protect and defend the interests they represent. They are by nature official corporations
and as such are at all times on the side of the politically constituted powers" (43).
Throughout the Republican era the Chambers made various public declarations
which expressed their concern over the socioeconomic situation (44).
In the 1940's the vertical trade union attempted to integrate the Chambers of
Commerce, but without much success. However, the Chambers were weakened and
placed under Government Control (45). In the 60's, when the economy began to be less
heavily regulated, the Chambers were permitted to elect their own representative
bodies (46).
The history of the Chambers of Commerce has not always developed parallel to
the history of the rest of Spain. The traditional protectionist interests of Catalan industry
contrasted with the free trade practices in other sectors of the economy. The link
between the political elite and the employers' associations has also been historically
different. In the mid-Sixties one sector of the business community acted through the
Economists' Association (Círculo de Economía) to renew the Chambers' governing
bodies (47), although without much success as regards the Catalan Employers'
Association (Fomento de Trabajo). Although not many studies have been made on the
Catalan Employers' Association (48), it can still safely be said that its interests did not
always coincide with those of the Chambers of Commerce and that its publicly
expressed attitudes towards Catalan autonomy differed from the views of the
Chambers (49).
When the Statute of Catalan Autonomy was passed, the State powers over the
Chambers of Commerce were transferred to the Catalan Government, the Generalitat
de Catalunya. (50)
The last Chamber of Commerce elections were held at the end of 1986. The
next elections are scheduled for the end of 1990.
3.1. Chambers of Commerce: Their authority and jurisdiction
We shall not make a detailed study of the Chambers' authority and juridisction here, but
shall instead give a general description of their principal functions, stressing those
directly related to representing and defending particular interests.
Certain powers are delegated to the Chambers of Commerce and exercised on
behalf of the Government. Among them are the powers to issue certificates attesting to
the origin of merchandise, legalize signatures and invoices and issue temporary export
certificates. These are all things that facilitate international trade and have traditionally
been the province of the Chambers of Commerce which also promote foreign trade,
arrange trade fair exhibits and organize trade missions, either independently or in
collaboration with the Administration. Members of the Chambers of Commerce who
take part in these activities directly benefit from belonging tc the Chamber.
Other operations involve offering logistic support to promote business activities
(the Chambers of Commerce provide technical and legal information, arrange training
programs, provide information on new markets and technologies). Use of these
services varies greatly and depends a good deal on the size and type of the individual
business firm. Big businesses have their own facilities for these services, while the very
smallest businesses are barely aware of the services offered by the Chambers. Only a
small percentage of Chambers of Commerce voting members directly benefit from any
of these activities.
As part of their general business promotor activities, the Chambers of
Commerce are partners in the mixed public/private corporations which manage the
trade shows in every Spanish city. A good example of this is the Barcelona Trade Fair,
the President of which is a member of the Chamber of Commerce's Executive
Committee. The Barcelona City Council and the Generalitat de Catalunya are also
partners in the Fair.
Recently the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce and other public corporations
have begun appearing before the Barcelona Court of Arbitration as arbitrators in equity
(52).
But it is their role as consultants to the Administration which makes them the
subject of study as interest groups. Legislation (53) empowers them to "appear before
all types of authorities, agencies and corporations" and “exercise actions and file all
types of appeals with executive and judicial authorities” (54). This means that the
Chambers should be consulted on all pending legislation related to economic and
social issues. They are also entitled to -and actually do- file declarations relative to
local government budgets, city planning projects and fiscal regulations (55).
3.2. Chambers of Commerce: their internal structure and representation
Compulsory membership in Chambers of Commerce takes the form of a
surcharge on all permits to engage in industrial, commercial, professional or maritime
activities (56). This means that every licensed individual or company belongs to a
Chamber of Commerce.
Most Chamber of Commerce officials naturally favour maintaining the system of
compulsory membership, although a very small number would accept a change in the
system provided it was "controlled" and that the Chambers were reorganized so as to
provide better service.
Even members of the business community themselves are scarcely aware that
they belong to the Chamber of Commerce. In 1960 Professors Linz and de Miguel (57)
made a study in which only 71% of the businessmen interviewed said they belonged to
a Chamber of Commerce. The surveys made by Martínez in 1981 (55), revealed that
this percentage was only 55.7% in Madrid, 56.3% in Barcelona and 84.6% in Valencia.
The author attributes Valencia's high percentage to the fact that there is a large group
of exporters there who regularly use the Chamber's services.
Elections to the Chambers' governing bodies -the Full Committee and the
Executive Committee- are held every four years. Members of the Chambers are
classified by groups and categories (according to their sector of activity and whether
they work in business or industry) and representation in the Full Committee is
proportionate to their number and financial contribution. Elections are held within each
group. Legislation establishes that if the number of candidates is the same as the
number of members to be elected, election is automatic. If the number of candidates is
smaller than the number of members to be elected to the Full Conmittee, all candidates
are elected and the Committee will appoint the remaining members of each group.
This rule is symptomatic of an electoral system where participation is limited.
When elections were held in Catalonia in 1986, a number of Chambers and groups
had trouble finding people willing to be candidates and general inertia led to the
reelection of many incumbents (59). In some places, the Chamber's "establishment"
negotiated with each sector in order to get representatives in the Chamber (60). In
others there was a certain amount of competition (61).
Members of the Full Committee elect the President and the members of the
Executive Committee by individual, secret ballot. No significant majority is required.
The President and the members of the Executive Committee are the real stars of the
Chambers inasmuch as most Chambers hold only the minimum number of Full
Committee meetings required by law (six per year). This can be verified by comparing
the number of hours the members of the Full Committee and the Executive Committee
dedicate to Chamber activities.
The Chambers of Commerce also have a number of permanent employees,
headed by a Secretary, to perform the duties delegated to them by the Administration.
The number of employees depends upon the size of the Chamber's budget. The larger
Chambers of Commerce, such as those of Barcelona and Gerona, are set up more
like business firms and also have a Managing Director.
There is at least one Chamber of Commerce in every province. Although there
are also county and municipal Chambers of Commerce, current legislation (62) makes
it difficult to establish Chambers operating in these smaller spheres.
There are thirteen Chambers of Commerce in Catalonia. Four of them are
province-wide and the other nine are county-wide or municipal Chambers. The
following table will give an idea of their size.
Table3
Table4
3.3. Chambers of Commerce: Their Sociopolitical Composition
The first part of this paper included various interpretations of the relationships
between the political elite and interest groups. Advocates of determinist positions
maintain that the political elite represents the dominant social groups and that their
political behavior responds to their own interests.
From the perspective of empirical analysis we can verify that various members
of the different Chambers of Commerce are also active members of certain political
parties. At this stage in our work, we have simply listed the number of Full Committee
members elected in 1986 who also ran in the 1987 municipal elections. The results can
be seen in the following chart:
Table5
Data collected by R. Martínez in 1981 (63) will give an idea of how Full
Committee members place themselves on the left/right political scale:
Table6
From currently available data it would seem that members of the Full
Committees of the Chambers of Commerce place themselves towards the center of
the left/right scale. One of my working hypotheses is that the data collected in the 1981
study is conditioned by the strained relations between UCD and the employers'
organizations at that time. In 1989 and after 7 years of PSOE government, members of
the business community would place themselves differently on the scale.
We also have some information about the business community's opinion of the
Franco regime. The results of the 1981 survey are as follows:
Table7
Currently available information does not appear to substantially alter these
percentages, although members of the business community now show a slight
tendency to favor the most moderate opinion.
3 .4. Chambers of Commerce and the socioeconomic context.
The following are some partial and preliminary findings from the survey currently
being made of the members of the Full Committees of the thirteen Catalan Chambers
of Commerce (65). They are being surveyed on the current economic situation. Most of
the questions being asked are the same questions used by Martínez in the work
mentioned above (66).
The business community's concept of the State's role in the economy is
somewhat different now than it was in 1981 (67) when the replies were as follows:
Table8
Information gathered up to now reveals an increase in the number of people who
are in favor of free enterprise and would consequently reduce the State's role to the
minimum. Correlatively the advocates of a limited public sector have declined. If these
results are confirmed, it might be assumed that less interventionist stances have
become stronger in the Eighties. This is in line with the opinions of members of
business communities in other European countries.
In the light of the evolution of the business cycle the opinions expressed on
productivity are quite interesting.(68)
Table9
Figures from 1986-1989 indicate that while the percentages remain more or
less the same for those who consider productivity to have increased either somewhat
or a good deal, there is a definite decrease in the percentage of people who feel that
productivity has declined. This clearly coincides with available gauges of economic
performance.
It is interesting not only to compare the opinions on EC membership held in
1981 with those held today after three years of full membership, but also to compare
the opinions on future prospects.
Table10
Preliminary data on the current impact of EEC membership on particular
sectors rather than individual companies are naturally very conditioned by the size of
each company, the sector to which it belongs, and, particularly, the importance of
imports as compared to its own share of the market.
On a more subjective level, the percentage of businessmen in favor of the
Single European Market is overwhelming, just as it is in other European countries.
3.5. Do Chambers of Commerce correspond to employers' organizations?
One of the primary aims of our study is to discover what sort of interests the
Chambers of Commerce defend arid whether or not they coincide with the interests of
employers' associations. A qualitative analysis of replies from several members of the
Chambers to questions on the relationships between the Chambers and employers'
associations reveals several postures, which can be summarized as follows:
- The Chambers of Commerce defend the same interests as the employers'
associations and consequently there is close collaboration between them.
- The employers' organizations are more independent of the Government and thus
better able to defend business interests.
It is important to examine the different opinions on how closely linked the
Chambers of Commerce are to the different public administrations because these links
affect the type of relationships that can be established and the extent of autonomy in
mediating in favor of particular interests. Autonomy of action also affects criticism of
government action to a greater or lesser extent.
The attitudes towards the Generalitat and the Spanish State government are
quite revealing. The people surveyed felt that the Generalitat is closer to their problems,
although the general consensus of opinion is that the Catalan government has very
limited powers in socioeconomic matters. However, it was not felt that an increase in
powers of this type would be particularly beneficial.
In an attempt to compare the activities of Chambers of Commerce and
employers' organizations we used the same question used by R. Martínez in 1981 to
define the powers of these latter organizations. In 1981, the activities of the employers'
associations were ranked as follows: (70)
Table11
It is interesting to note that employers' organizations score quite low in terms of
trade relations with other countries, which is one of the traditional strong points of the
Chambers of Commerce. It is also interesting to note how many people consider they
are instrumental in reaching “market agreements”, which are specifically prohibited by
EC regulations on competition.
In terms of political and electoral activities we must remember that Martínez
made his survey not long after the employers' association, Fomento de Trabajo, had
taken an active part in the 1980 elections to the Catalan Parliament (71). Employers'
associations were subsequently active participants in the elections to the Galician
(1981) and Andalusian (1982) Parliaments.
It can be deduced from our data that advocates of "political interventionism" are
on the decline, while use of other channels of influence is on the rise.
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
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